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An investigation was conducted into sources of error within a safety-critical
software design task. A number of convergent methods of task- and error-analysis
were systematically applied: hierarchical task analysis (HTA), error log audit,
error observation, work sample and laboratory experiment. HTA, which
provided the framework for the deployment of subsequent methods, revealed
possible weaknesses in the areas of task automation and job organization.
Application of other methods within this more circumscribed context focused on
the impact of task and job design issues. The use of a convergent methods
approach draws attention to the bene®ts and shortcomings of individual analysis
methods, and illustrates the advantages of combining techniques to analyse
complex problems. The features that these techniques should possess are
highlighted.
1. Introduction
1.1. Task analysis for the investigation of human error
The term `task analysis’ describes a plethora of techniques intended to describe and
examine the tasks carried out by human beings within a system (for a comprehensive
review see Kirwan and Ainsworth 1992). The range of human factors domains to
which task analysis techniques can be applied is broad, including training, task and
job design, allocation of function and performance assurance. Although they have
the same general goal, diŒerent techniques may be suitable for answering diŒerent
kinds of questions, in diŒerent kinds of work systems. This paper is concerned with
an investigation into the human factors underlying the commission and detection of
human error in railway signalling software design.
Within the context of performance assurance (i.e. the consideration of factors
necessary to ensure system performance within acceptable tolerances), human error
is of paramount importance, especially in safety-critical systems. Many analysis
methods can be used to investigate the role of human fallibility in systems (e.g.
SHERPA, human HAZOP; see Kirwan 1992a) . Used as Human Error Identi®cation
(HEI) techniques, they are often applied within the framework of Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA), where the set of undesirable events that could occur within a
system is de®ned, along with the paths that lead to them and the probability of their
occurrence. The assessment and use of Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) has been
criticized when applying absolute error probabilities (Hollnagel 1993). The authors
would argue that HEPs are more reliable when comparing relative error probabilities
associated with diŒerent parts of a task than when used to give absolute error
probabilities.
1.2. Human reliability analysis and the nature of the system
For process control system operation and similar environments, where many of these
techniques were developed, HEI methods have undoubtedly proved to be useful.
Such systems are `physical’ in nature and the hazards they present tend to be
delimited, or `bound’, by the physical properties of system elements and the actual or
potential physical linkages between system components. In this context an operator
actionÐsay, closing a valveÐwill only be able to aŒect aspects of the system that the
valve has the physical potential to aŒect. Even if this potential includes causing an
explosion, the sphere of in¯uence of this is in principle determinable.
These constraints do not apply when considering the design of software systems.
Errors made in the task of programming computer-based systems are not subject to
the `bounding’ of error by physical principles in the way described above. Instead,
the sphere of in¯uence of an error is only limited by the power and ¯exibility of the
programming language used. The development of complex systems requires the use
of powerful languages that can express that complexity. This means that even the
most simple of errors (e.g. misnaming one variable) could result in unpredictable and
potentially disastrous consequences for the logic embodied by the system. These
consequences will not necessarily be con®ned to the speci®c aspect of the system to
which the error relates. By unintentionally overwriting a section of memory, for
instance, otherÐlogically and functionally unrelatedÐparts of the system can be
aŒected. This means that virtually all aspects of the programming task could lead to
hazardous outcomes, rather than particular, easily identi®able sections. As stated by
Broom®eld and Chung (1995: 223) `no established technique is available for relating
software faults to system hazards’.
1.3. Human error identi®cation methods
The eŒectiveness of most HEI techniques depends upon the expertise and experience
of the analyst, and this holds true for more general examples of task analysis
methods as well. This is because, almost without exception, these methods are based
solely or primarily upon the judgements of expert practitioners, who are themselves
open to biases and errors of cognition. Whether through interviews or through task
documentation, the information gathered regarding tasks and possible errors will
usually be subjective in nature. Some HEI methods attempt to reduce the eŒects of
practitioner bias by using expert-system-like computerized question and answer
routines (e.g. SHERPA), but the potential problem of a task expert’s faulty or
incomplete mental model of the system is not addressed. This is of particular
importance in the context of computer programming, where there is unlikely to be a
complete mental model of how errors will aŒect system performance for the reasons
outlined in § 1.2.
The development of a programming language, e.g. C+ + ; Ada, is a good
example of a complex programming task. The development is usually accompanied
or followed by a standardization process, which attempts to remove inconsistencies,
unde®ned behaviour, etc. from the language. The standardization is carried out by
committees such as ANSI (American National Standards Institute) and ISO
(International Standards Organisation), made up of experts from around the globe.
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However, Hatton (1995: 56) points out `[standardisation] committees simply forget
things or don’t understand the full implications of some features at the time of
standardisation’. These errors come to light during use of the languages, and are
referred back to the committee by the programmers who discover them. For the Ada
language, developed in part for safety-related applications, Hatton (1995) reported
that there were around 2000 of these `interpretation requests’ outstanding.
1.4. Convergent methods approach
It can be seen that features of the computer software design task pose problems for
the investigation of human error. In the main, HEI techniques are powerful and
¯exible methods that can be used eŒectively in a range of task environments. It is
contended, however, that in the study of error in computer programming, and
certainly in the context of safety-critical systems, they should not be used alone. `It is
recommended that reliance is not placed on a single technique of HEI’ (Kirwan
1992b: 378). A broader-based approach is needed, using more than one method in
order to provide convergent validation, and to allow diŒerent parts of system
performance to be adequately investigated. This calls for the use of a set of diŒering
analysis methods and data sources, including actual task performance, rather than
traditional `expert-opinion’ focused task analysis alone. Using this combination a
`matrix’ of evidence regarding overall system integrity can be built up.
This paper considers such an approach to the analysis of human error.
Speci®cally, the design of software for a safety-critical railway signalling control
system, called `Solid State Interlocking’ (SSI), is described in § 2. Section 3 details the
initial task analysis of this design process. Section 4 describes an empirical error
analysis used to provide convergent evidence for the investigation. It should be noted
that this study is an investigation into the factors aŒecting production and detection
of error, not a PRA of the system.
2. Solid State Interlocking
As a case study of a complex safety-critical system, the design of data for a railway
signalling safety system was investigated. `Solid State Interlocking’ (SSI) auto-
matically controls the signals, points, etc. in a section of railway, ensuring that only
safe movements of trains are allowed to take place. Each SSI is triply hardware
redundant (three identical central processors), but the `geographic data’ that speci®es
the logic for the movement of trains is unique to each SSI, and the same version is
loaded into all three processors. This means that the `data’ must be correct, as any
faults could allow collisions or de-railments.
Figure 1 shows a small section of a highly simpli®ed signalling diagram. It
represents a plan view of the railway layout. Track sections are shown labelled T1,
T2, etc. Signals are represented by three schematic lights and are labelled S1, S2, etc.
Where tracks converge or diverge there are gaps, representing sets of points, labelled
P1 and P2.
Below the diagram is a simpli®ed section of data, showing the conditions that
must be ful®lled before Route 2 (R2; from S1 to S7) can be set. This entails checking
that the route is available (R2 a), e.g. not barred because of maintenance; that the
points are in the correct position, or free to be moved to the correct position (P1 crf,
P2 cnf); and that other, opposing routes are not already set, which is done by
checking two opposing sub-routes to ensure that they are free (U10-AB f, U3-BC f).
If these checks are passed, then the route is set (R2 s); the individual sub-routes in
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Route 2 are locked (e.g. U3-CB l); the points are moved to the correct position (P1
cr, P2 cn); and the route entrance signal is checked to see if it is available to be
changed to green (S2 clear bpull). It is the programming, veri®cation and validation
process for this data that is the focus of the present study.
3. Task analysis
The technique of Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA: Annett and Duncan 1967) was
chosen for the initial investigation of the SSI design process. HTA has existed for so
long, and it has been so widely used, that it could be described as `traditional’.
Associated with it is a range of `traditional’ sources of data, including the technicalÐ
and the critical incidentÐinterview, system documentation and operator observa-
tion. This technique was chosen because of its ¯exible and systematic task
decomposition process. Used with the data sources listed above, it would provide
the framework for the later error analysis, which could then be used to provide a
retrospective validation of the technique.
3.1. Hierarchical task analysis method
A `process analysis’, as suggested by Piso (1981), was conducted concurrently with
the initial stages of the HTA. The process analysis sets out to describe the production
process, functioning of equipment, jargon, and general task environment, so that a
framework for the HTA itself is provided. HTA is used to describe the goals that the
operator must ful®l and the plans to schedule them. First, the overall, or
superordinate, goal of the SSI design system is broken down into a number of
sub-goals, along with the plan required for structuring, ordering and performing
them. This procedure is then iterated, each sub-goal being assessed to see if it
warrants further redescription. Consideration of performance shaping factors (e.g.
expertise, task design, performance demands, oce environment) informed the
assessment of error-proneness of the operation or plan, and hence the level of
redescription required.
1
Figure 1. Example SSI signalling layout and data.
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The strengths and limitations of each of the sources of data listed earlier, i.e.
interviews with task experts, task-related documentation and video recorded task
observation, are discussed below.
3.2. Sources of data for HTA
3.2.1. Interviews: Interviews with task experts are an accessible and ¯exible method
of data collection. Interviewing is, however, a purely subjective method, liable to
error, omission and bias. To reduce these eŒects a number of steps were taken.
Various personnel were interviewed, from managers to trainees, to avoid gaining a
view of the data design task coloured from one organizational perspective. As well as
formal interviews, informal chats with staŒ were entered into wherever possible. It
was felt that, especially in a safety-critical industry, the less the participants were
made to feel scrutinized the more likely they were to be honest about the way in
which tasks were conducted and about the errors that could occur.
3.2.2. Documentation: Guides, manuals and training materials give detailed
information on how a task should be done, although they are unlikely to reveal
how a task is actually done. In the domain of programming tasks, it will tend to be
more a description of the `tools of the trade’, rather than a `recipe’ to achieve correct
task performance.
3.2.3. Observation: Task observation allows features and problems of task
performance to be revealed that otherwise may not come to light using the above
methods (e.g. assumed knowledge). The `observer eŒect’ is, however, likely to have
an in¯uence on task performance that is especially unwelcome when investigating
error.
3.3. Task analysis results
The data gathered from all sources were amalgamated into a hierarchical diagram of
the SSI data design process. For a fuller description of the HTA, see Westerman et
al. (1994). The full diagram consisted of seven levels of the hierarchy, around 150
individual operations structured by 40 plans of various complexity. A brief overview
of the process of SSI data design is shown in the hierarchical diagram (®gure 2),
showing the ®rst three levels of the hierarchy.
Box 0 contains the overall goal of the system, boxes 1 and 2 below being the sub-
goals required to accomplish it. The relationship between boxes 1 and 2 is shown in
Plan 0. These sub-goals are then further redescribed in boxes 1.1 to 2.2. Each
horizontal level of the hierarchy is a complete description of the task, at higher detail
the lower the level.
The task is roughly divided into two areas (boxes 1 and 2 on the diagram): oce-
based production and site-based installation. The actual programming process
consists of four stages: preparation (writing; 1.2), set to work (simple testing; 1.3),
bench checking (code inspection; 1.4) and testing (1.5). These stages will be the focus
of this study. In terms of the system life-cycle, these stages correspond to the
detailed-design and build of the system (1.2, 1.3), and the veri®cation and validation
process (1.4, 1.5). Plan 1 speci®es how these tasks are linked. The equipment
available for the task is a dedicated UNIX system called the Design Work Station
(DWS). The data are written at the terminals of the DWS. Printouts can then be
produced for static code inspection, or data checking as it is called. The data can also
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be downloaded to an SSI processor module, which acts as a simulator for the
functional testing of the data. The tester performs functional tests of the SSI data by
using a trackball to scroll across a graphical representation of the signalling layout
(similar to ®gure 1), and setting elements to their various states.
Essentially, the SSI data are written, and then brie¯y tested using a computer-
based simulation of the railway network. This ®rst testing session is carried out
by the author of the data, to ensure that it meets certain minimum standards. A
printout of the data is then checked by another engineer who has had no part in
the writing process. Finally, the data are again loaded onto a simulator, where
they are subjected to more rigorous and formal testing by a specially quali®ed
engineer who must have had no part in either of the preceding stages. If any
errors are found during either the check or formal test, they are logged and the
data returned to their author for amendments, and the whole cycle gone through
once more.
Regarding the stang for the various stages, expertise tends to increase from
left to right. The most expert and quali®ed signalling engineers are employed at
the testing stage, the `last line of defence’ to remove faults in the data. The least
experienced are employed in writing the data, although they can seek help from
more senior engineers who are not involved on the project. Expertise is gained in
the ®rst instance by a number of 2-week training courses that instruct the newly
recruited trainee-engineer in basic railway signalling and SSI data. Most training
is done `on-the-job’, however, with novices tackling progressively more
complicated aspects of the data preparation task, and then going on to qualify
for checking, etc. There is not the space here to review all of the potential
problems highlighted by the HTA, but some of the more interesting ones are
described below.
Figure 2. Overview of the HTA for designing and installing an SSI.
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If the HTA is carried out systematically, structural features of the HTA
hierarchical diagram can be used to highlight elements of the task being studied. For
instance, the pattern of the overall diagram (not shown) and the speci®c goals within
this pattern revealed the similarity of the writing and checking tasks compared to the
testing task.
Consideration of an organizational change revealed a potentially serious problem
relating to the introduction of automation in the data writing task. To increase
productivity, all of the signalling ®rms taking part in this study were in the process of
developing computer-based tools to automatically write much of the simpler, rule-
based data straight from a signalling plan. This will have the eŒect of removing much
of the training that novice data writers gain by tackling these tasks, and leave them
less equipped to handle the more complex, knowledge-based data that was identi®ed
in interviews as the most problematic.
Time pressure occasionally forces some checking and testing to be carried out in
parallel, leading to a revised Plan 1 (®gure 3). This means that the version control for
the data must be very tight, or unchecked data could be signed-oŒ as safe by the
tester. Normally, each new version of the data is given a unique version number by
the data writer. This number records how many cycles of checking and testing the
data has gone through, but not whether the latest version was generated because
errors were found in a check or a test. If it was a test, has that version of data been
checked as being error-free before? The danger point is shown by the dashed
diamond in ®gure 3. If this decision is made incorrectly, unchecked data could be
released into service. This problem is exacerbated by the contracting-out of the
checking or testing of these `rush’ jobs to other signalling ®rms, with an attendant
increase in the diculty of version control.
Figure 3. Revised plan 1, for when checking (1.4) and testing (1.5) are carried out in parallel.
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3.4. The need for error analysis
The ®rst phases of the analysis showed that HTA provides a useful framework for
the breakdown of potential problem areas in a task. As discussed above, structural
elements of the hierarchical diagram can be used to show similarities and diŒerences
between tasks. However, these similarities do not necessarily equate to similarities in
actual task performance. For example, although identi®ed as similar by the HTA,
performance in writing and checking may not be identical even given identical data,
i.e. data that are dicult to write may be easy to check and vice versa. What HTA
does not reveal is how all of the variables that may aŒect task performance will
actually combine to produce error.
4. Error analysis
The HTA was used to identify the key stages of SSI data production: writing,
checking and testing. These were then analysed using a variety of empirical
techniques. Crucially, not only the individual tasks in isolation, but also the
combination of tasks that together make up the overall system needed to be assessed.
Several complementary techniques were chosen to provide data for the error
analysis. These were chosen partly on the basis of availability, but also to give a
broad range in terms of the type of data that they would provide. Existing error logs
would be supplemented by observation to provide work-based data. A work sample
and laboratory experimentation would be used to investigate in detail issues brought
to light from the workplace. These methods are now addressed in sequence. (For
further details see Westerman et al. (1995a).)
4.1. Error log audit
4.1.1. Method: The logs used to communicate faults found in formal checking and
testing to the data writer were the data source for this method. They revealed errors
made not only by the data writer (boxes 1.2 and 1.3 in ®gure 2), but also by the data
checker (box 1.4 in ®gure 2), as faults found by the tester necessarily have been
missed by the checker. These logs detailed the SSI data faults in terms of their
functional manifestation rather than their underlying psychological cause, but still
provided rich information about the nature of errors. The main strength of this
method was its intrinsic validity: the errors were all committed and detected by
signalling engineers carrying out their normal job of work.
The primary weakness of the method is the uncontrolled nature of the variables
underlying the production and detection of errors. The number of faults in the data
depends mainly upon the skill of the data writer and the complexity of the work.
Usable measures of these factors were not available, however. In an attempt to
reduce bias, logs were included from 12 diŒerent signalling schemes, conducted by
seven diŒerent signalling ®rms at nine sites. Even when faults within a single scheme
were compared, so controlling for expertise and complexity, the detection of a fault
by the checker means that the fault is therefore unavailable for detection by the
tester.
Two classes of error were not recorded in the logs. The ®rst class is that of the
errors committed by the data writer, but also detected by him or her. These would be
corrected when discovered, and not be logged and passed on to the later stages. The
second class is that containing faults that are not caught by either checking or
testingÐperhaps the most important to study. Information regarding any faults
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discovered after the data were installed on-site, or any faults that remained latent
until accidents or incidents, was not available.
4.1.2. Results: Table 1 shows the breakdown of 580 faults detected by checking
and testing, 290 from each. The `T/C ratio’ speci®es the ratio of faults detected by
testing versus checking within each category (i.e. testing divided by checking). The
higher the ®gure, the greater is the frequency of detection by testing compared to
checking. The nature of the information in the logs means that the fault categories
mostly relate to the railway signalling principle that they would violate. The
exceptions are the `None’ category, which relates to false-alarm errors by the checker
or tester (the data were actually correct); and the `Other’ category, which details
miscellaneous SSI data-language speci®c errors, which do not relate to speci®c
signalling principles.
There are a number of reasons why it would be misleading to use these results to
make a formal quantitative comparison of the relative ecacy of the checking and
testing processes. First, the error logs were gathered from a number of diŒerent
schemes and therefore the checking and testing logs were not fully matched. Second,
any faults detected at the checking phase were not available for detection at the
testing stage, and consequently there is no means of estimating the eciency of the
testing process in detecting these faults. Third, there were no measures available of
the total numbers of faults that escaped both checking and testing, again making
estimation of the ecacy of the testing stage problematic.
Given these reservations, a number of qualitative features are of note, however.
The T/C ratio shows an advantage of checking over testing for the `Other’ category.
The `Opposing locking’ category, which contains errors made in barring the setting
of two con¯icting routes, shows a bias towards testing. Also of note is the
preponderance of faults in the `Identity’, `Other’ and `Route’ categories (62.8 % of
all faults). Much of the SSI data that relates to these categories is similar to that
shown in ®gure 1. Overall, it is simpler and more straightforward than data
controlling other functions, and could be considered as requiring more skill- and
rule-based performance and less knowledge-based performance (Rasmussen 1983)
than data relating to `Aspect sequencing’, `Opposing locking’, etc.
A total of 12.4% of all faults logged turned out to be false alarms, where no
actual fault was present in the data. Several `repeat’ faults were found in the logs.
These refer to faults found at either the check or test that were still present when the
Table 1. Faults detected at the checking and testing stages of SSI data production.
Fault category: signalling principle Checking Testing T/C ratio
Category
(% of total)
None (false alarm)
Identity and labelling errors
Route setting
Signal aspect control
Approach locking
Opposing locking
Aspect sequence
Other
Total
46
26
74
14
11
9
4
106
290
26
30
120
32
24
39
12
7
290
0.57
1.15
1.62
2.29
2.18
4.33
3.00
0.07
1.00
12.4
9.7
33.4
7.9
6.0
8.3
2.8
19.7
100
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SSI data were re-checked or re-tested, and testi®es to diculties in writing the data
correctly. These faults applied to particularly novel, knowledge-based SSI data.
Where information was available to show the number of faults logged at successive
checking cycles, seemingly simple faults made in the `Identity’ and `Other’ categories
were the only ones to escape detection until the fourth cycle. Similar information was
not available for the testing stage.
4.2. Error observation
4.2.1. Method: Errors committed but subsequently detected by the same writer,
checker or tester were not recorded in the error logs. To compensate for this, a
period of in situ error observation was conducted. In addition to the task areas
accessed by the error logs, this method provided some insight into the fallibility of
testers (box 1.5, ®gure 2). DiŒerent engineers were video recorded performing several
hours of the three main task areas. Interference of the task could aŒect error-rate, so
to disturb the tasks as little as possible the participants were asked to carry on their
work as normal, but to comment if they found that they had, or had nearly, made an
error. They were then prompted as to the reasons they identi®ed as causing the error,
in an attempt to classify it as a skill- or rule-based slip or lapse, or a knowledge-based
mistake (Rasmussen 1983; Reason 1990). The complexity of the task being
undertaken, and the expertise and experience of the engineer were also used to
inform the categorization of errors. While the possibility of `faking’ a lack of errors
existed, the video recording of the sessions and possibility of peer review by other
engineers eŒectively minimized this.
4.2.2. Results: Table 2 shows the number of errors ¯agged by participants during
the periods of task observation shown, and is divided up by task stage. The writing
task is further subdivided by the nature of the speci®c writing task being carried out.
Data writing does not equate to mere typing (editing), but also includes reviewing,
checking speci®cations and requirements, and planning. It can be seen that data
editing on its own accounts for most of the errors in the writing task as a whole. The
most error-prone signalling principle in the data editing was `Opposing locking’, with
®ve errors. Of these, the most time consuming of all of the errors was observed. Fully
1.5 hours were spent by one engineer attempting to ®nd the relevant help in the
paper-based manual available for the task. In the testing stage, most errors related to
confusion over elements selected for testing on the VDU display. No knowledge-
based errors were observed in any stage. No errors at all were observed in 3 h of
checking.
Table 2. Errors observed at the writing, checking and testing stages of SSI data production.
Error category
Writing
(all-including
editing)
(7.5 h)
Writing
(editing only)
(3 h)
Checking
(3 h)
Testing
(6.25 h)
Skill- and rule-based errors
Knowledge-based errors
Errors per hour
31
0
4.1
25
0
8.3
0
0
0
5
0
0.8
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4.3. Work sample test
4.3.1. Method: Since the above two techniques are based on naturalistic analyses
of work, they are susceptible to a lack of control over the initial SSI data. To
compensate for this, a data writing work sample test was devised that would further
inform the analysis of box 1.2 of the HTA (®gure 2). A previously completed data set
(for an SSI currently in service) had sections of data removed, and signalling
engineers were recruited to complete the work under controlled, but work-based,
conditions. This enabled task factors (e.g. complexity) to be studied. Fifteen data
writers took part in the test. Although this is a small number for statistical purposes,
it represents approximately one-third of all of the suitable candidates working for
organizations participating in the research project. The participants in the work
sample test had a wide range of experience, from 6 months to 10 years, and were
drawn from three diŒerent signalling oces. To ensure the representativeness of the
work sample a highly experienced engineer was employed to select the SSI data,
which included all of the main aspects of the writing task. The input of the
researchers was used to ensure that both straightforward and novel SSI data
elements were represented, so that rule-based and knowledge-based performance
could be assumed to be utilized by the participants.
4.3.2. Results: Table 3 shows the completion times and faults for the diŒerent task
types used in the test. For the rule-based task performance, faults in the completed
data were scored per signalling function violated, as for the error log audit. This
avoided the biasing of the results possible when one cognitive error resulted in many
faults in the SSI data. For instance, one error made by a number of engineers,
involved the unintentional omission of a whole signalling function. This single
cognitive error resulted in the omission of several lines of data and tens of data
`words’. Assessing errors by the line or data `word’ would have given arbitrary scores
dependent on how many lines or words made up a particular signalling function.
This scoring system would have been inappropriate for the knowledge-based
data, as the small amount of code involved related to only one signalling function,
which nobody got completely correct. Additionally, each data `word’ in the
knowledge-based section contributed a particular aspect to the overall functionality
of the feature, independently of the other `words’ (which was not generally the case
for the rule-based data). The knowledge-based task element was thus scored by the
data word, to give a usable index of `correctness’.
Table 3. Completion times and data faults in the work sample test.
Completion time (s) Faults
Aspect of the task Mean SD Time per line Mean SD
Rule-based performance
(124 lines of data; n= 15)
Knowledge-based
performance
(4 lines of data; n= 13)
Total performance
(128 lines of data; n= 13)
9518
1120
10103
2958
458
3013
76.8
280
78.9
9.5
3.7
10.9
7.6
1.8
4.4
1729Task analysis for safety-critical software design
The diŒerences between the two scoring systems makes formal statistical
comparison between rule- and knowledge-based fault performances misleading.
However, were the rule-based faults to be scored by the data word this would
inevitably increase rather than decrease the scores, and so this points to a
preponderance of rule-based over knowledge-based faults. On the other had, it can
be seen that knowledge-based data is much more time-consuming to complete, per
line of data, than the rule-based section (t (12) = 10.7, p< 0.001), and its diculty is
also demonstrated by the fact that the two least experienced participants could not
complete it. (Their data are thus not included, giving n = 13 for the knowledge-based
elements.)
Regarding rule-based data, the problem of `common-mode failure’ was
highlighted. A term usually used in system safety, it refers to situations in which
seemingly independent components can fail due to the same underlying cause.
Evidence for common-mode failure was found when it was seen that four speci®c
faults were made identically by seven participants or more; indeed, one of these
faults was made by 13 participants. These faults made up the largest single rule-
based category, encompassing 40 of the 142 errors.There was no pattern relating to
the signalling ®rms or sites of the participants making these errors, or their expertise.
Task-related factors, and their interaction with human cognition, are thus
implicated. It was found that three of the four common-mode errors related to
familiar data that, because of the speci®c instances used, required infrequently
needed parameters. These errors can be characterized as habit intrusions, or `strong
but wrong’ errors (Reason 1990).
4.4. Laboratory experiment
4.4.1. Method: In real work, the detection of a fault by a checker renders this
fault unavailable to a tester. Therefore, to investigate the relative ecacy of the
two processes, computer-based, simpli®ed task simulations were developed for
completion by novice participants acting as either checkers (n = 13) or testers
(n = 27). Sets of identical, detectable faults were seeded into both task simulations
(16 faults per simulation), and performance of the novice checkers and testers
compared (corresponding to boxes 1.4 and 1.5 in ®gure 2). The fault types were
chosen from actual logs in the error log audit. `Route setting’ was chosen because
it contained frequent faults. `Signal aspect control’ and `Opposing locking’
showed great diŒerences between checking and testing. Two categories of
`Opposing locking’ faults were chosen, re¯ecting the two diŒerent methods by
which this signalling principle is dealt with in the SSI data. It was thought that
these two methods may have diŒerential eŒects on the relative ecacy of
checking versus testing. Some fault categories (e.g. `Aspect sequence’, `Other’)
could not be used because of the need to make the errors equally `visible’ to
checkers and testers, and the simpli®cation of the simulation compared to the real
task.
4.4.2. Results: Table 4 shows the probability of detection of the four types of faults
seeded into the checking and testing task simulations. Analysis of variance revealed
no main eŒect of task type (checking versus testing), but there was a signi®cant
interaction between task type and fault type (F (3,72) = 10.58, p< 0.001). This is
attributable to the comparatively poor performance of checkers in detecting
`Opposing locking I’ faults, and of testers in detecting `Signal aspect control’ faults.
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False alarm rate (i.e. the percentage of logs relating to non-existent faults) was
22.5% in the checking task, 27.6% in the testing task, 25.0% overall.
5. Discussion
The utility of diŒerent task- and error-analysis techniques, as applied to the
identi®cation and analysis of human error in the SSI design process, is apparent
when these methods are considered in concert. This `triangulation’ (Denzin 1988)
confers powerful cross-validation of the techniques by consideration of how the
evidence presented by each combines when applied to the same task area. It may be
that the methods do not address the same factor, in which case the methods are
independent. If they do address the same factor, they can either converge or diverge.
5.1. Error type
An example of divergence between analysis methods is seen when considering the
type of error most problematic for the SSI data production system. HTA critical-
incident interviews consistently identi®ed complex, knowledge-based data design
tasks as the most problematic type. In support of this, no participants in the work
sample were able to complete the knowledge-based data without faults, and the time
taken to complete this small amount of data also testi®es to its diculty. In the error
logs, novel, complex data were repeatedly passed on to the checking stages while still
incorrect, again suggesting the diculty in writing these data. The error observation
technique showed that knowledge-based errors also appeared much less likely than
rule-based errors to be self-detected during writing.
On the other hand, the error log audit found that the majority of faults were
being discovered in simpler, rule-based SSI data. From the error observation it was
seen that around eight skill- and rule-based errors per hour were being self-detected
while data editing, and the work sample test showed that around four skill- or rule-
based errors per hour were not being self-detected. This indicated that a large
number of simple errors were being committed in the data writing, with a signi®cant
proportion not being self-detected by their engineer. Although a comparison of
errors per hour between faults in the rule- and knowledge-based data in the work
sample would not be fair (for the reasons outlined in § 4.3.2), it was shown that, as in
the error logs, many more rule-based faults occurred over the whole task.
So knowledge-based data seemed noticeably dicult and error prone to write,
but in all tasks viewed and the error logs, rule-based errors and faults predominated.
The answer probably lies in the relative opportunities to commit both types of error.
The work sample task contained only a small amount of complex, knowledge-based
data to complete, but it was selected in part because of its similarity to actual work;
indeed, it was part of an actual SSI scheme.
Table 4. Probability of fault detection (checking versus testing) in SSI task simulation.
Fault type
(4 faults per category) Checking Testing
Opposing locking I
Opposing locking II
Signal aspect control
Route setting
0.69
0.83
0.94
0.90
1.0
0.89
0.41
1.0
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A factor not considered in the above argument is fault detection. The error logs
do not provide an accurate ratio of knowledge-based to rule-based faults pre- and
post- checking and testing, which would allow the relative detectability of each to be
known. However, there is some continuous data (i.e. from the same SSI dataset)
relating to faults detected at each stage of checking. This showed that the only faults
to pass through three cycles without detection were ones in simple, rule-based data.
Again, this may not necessarily be because simpler faults are actually any harder to
detect than the knowledge-based ones. Indeed, even if they are easier to detect, the
number of simple faults escaping detection may be higher because of their higher
prior probability in the data.
Another factor in the number of rule-based faults may be the relative lack of
emphasis placed on their importance, as shown by the HTA interviews. This would
lead to more attention being given to parts of the data seen as challenging or
potentially more error prone than the simple and straightforward aspects. However,
virtually any faults in the data could have disastrous consequences.
The HTA suggested that knowledge-based data writing was more complex and
made more demands on the operator than simpler data, and this was supported by
the work sample test. However, HTA has little provision to represent explicitly the
event-rates that would have shown that knowledge-based data, although perhaps
more error-prone, is written far less often than the simpler data, and so has
correspondingly less in¯uence on overall system integrity.
The prevalence of simple errors and their diculty in detection has unanticipated
consequences for the introduction of automation. Although the original reasons for
the development of automation was economic, its introduction may have greater
than expected bene®ts if it can eradicate a potentially dangerous source of data
faults. However, its implications for training will still need to be addressed.
5.2. Common mode error
Common mode error was another problem area uncovered by the study. Checking,
or static code inspection, is seen as the most ecient method for revealing error in
computer programming code (Bezier 1990). The principle reason for this is that the
whole of the code can be inspected, as opposed to the limited amount of
functionality that can usually be tested in complex systems. (The error logs and
experiment showed both checking and testing to be similarly ecient; but this is
probably because a greater proportion of SSI functionality is testable than for
normal programmes.) However, the similarity of checking to the writing stage,
suggested by the HTA, may re¯ect underlying similarities in the tasks and mental
processing required by both stages. If this is the case, then checking may suŒer the
same weaknesses as writing, and so the processes may be liable to common-mode
failure. Indeed, a fault type seen to be problematic in the data writing error
observation (`Opposing locking’), was detected poorly by checkers in the error log
audit and in the laboratory experiment. Further evidence for this similarity is also
provided by the fact that the kind of simple errors observed most frequently in the
observation were those most resistant to detection by checking in the error log audit.
This may seem odd when considering simple slips, as they can be generated by
processes not aŒecting the checkers (e.g. typographic errors), and they are also
easiest to self-detect. However, the most striking examples of common-mode error
were the identical errors committed in the work sample test, with up to 87% of the
engineers making exactly the same error. This highlights the vulnerability of even
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highly trained engineers to exactly the same errors of cognition when in the same
task environment. Checkers will be liable to these same errors because of the similar
task factors to writing, and self-detection of these `habit intrusions’ will not be good,
as they are errors of intention, not action. Common-mode errors were also seen in
the laboratory experiment, with task environment (checking or testing) eŒectively
predicting which types of detection errors would be made.
5.3. Task diversity
The converse of task similarity is task diversity. DiŒerences between checking and
testing, suggested by the HTA, were con®rmed by qualitatively diŒerent error
detection performance between checking and testing found in the error log audit.
While encouraging, the error log results may have been due to a number of factors
other than the task environment (e.g. the initial number and type of faults in the
data). However, the result was con®rmed in the laboratory experiment, where the
seeded faults were exactly the same for checkers and testers. The results showed that
while there was no diŒerence in the overall fault detection performance between the
two methods, they did lead to the discovery of diŒerent types of fault. Almost
inevitably, because of the diŒerences between the real tasks and the simulations,
there were some diŒerences of detail between the error-log and laboratory
experiment results, e.g. in Signal aspect control faults. A number of factors may
have contributed to this, e.g. the diŒerence in participant characteristics, the reduced
range of faults in the simulation (16 versus 580 in the error logs). Given these
diŒerences, however, the fact that both studies still showed diŒerent fault detection
characteristics between checking and testing indicates that rather than the two stages
being an example solely of redundancy in the system, they are instead an example of
task diversity.
The use of task diversity can have positive implications for fault detection tasks
(Fagan 1986). DiŒerent task representations are likely to engender diŒerent mental
models in the operators, and lead to diŒerent emphases and task performance
strategies. This can render people less vulnerable to the threat of common mode
error present when tasks are too similar, as shown between SSI data writing and
checking. This diversity of knowledge, strategy and mental model of a task is known
as `Cognitive diversity’ (Westerman et al. 1995b, 1997).
The diversity between checking and testing has implications for the consequences
of the check stage being missed out when carrying out checking and testing in
parallel (®gure 3). This is because some of the faults in the data, such as those that
fall into the `Other’ category, are less likely to be detected by testing alone. To help
to ameliorate this problem a computer-based logging tool is currently under
development by the research team, to assist with fault logging and data version
control. It will also record some of the psychological error mechanisms that lead to
the faults, and help to aid the identi®cation of further error reduction techniques.
5.4. `Opposing locking’ faults
A consistent diŒerence between checking and testing performance was found for
`Opposing locking’ faults. It was apparent that checkers found these faults more
dicult to detect than testers, so a number of further experiments were performed to
ascertain why this might be the case (Shryane et al. 1996). `Opposing locking’ is dealt
with in SSI data by the use of sub-route labels, which de®ne a section of track and
also the ends of this section that the train will enter and leave by. For example in
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®gure 1, `U3-CB’ speci®es the sub-route `U3’ (corresponding to track section `T3’)
and that a train will enter/exit in the `CB’ direction. Exactly what `CB’ means in
terms of the associated spatial con®guration of the signalling diagram is determined
by the particular layout of the track, and is diŒerent for diŒerent track section
shapes. It was found that this inconsistent mapping between the spatial information
of the diagram and the textual sub-route label was associated with poor performance
in a simulated checking task. Testers do not have to assess the sub-route labels
directly, only the signalling functionality associated with their action.
5.5. Convergent methods
The methods used in this analysis all had a role to play in the investigation of human
error. In the ®rst instance, HTA provided an overview of the task not aŒorded by the
other methods. Additionally, HTA does not have to be a study of the task as is, but
can be used to investigate the implications of variations in the task. Together, these
features allowed the discovery of the organizational issues regarding the introduction
of automation. It is also useful for the consideration of sequencing and scheduling of
tasks, by nature of its plans, leading to the discovery of problems with parallel
checking and testing (®gure 3). These issues were not brought to light by the other
methods. HTA’s weakness was found to be in part due to the subjective nature of its
data sources. However, the inability to show quantitative aspects of tasks, such as
event and error rate, and how this aŒects the system is the biggest drawback of HTA
when considering the study of error.
The error log audit and error observation are both essentially error sampling
procedures of the task. Although the information that they produce can be `noisy’
due to its work environment origin, they do provide quantitative data on event and
error frequencies. The error logs did not provide direct evidence of certain types of
errors, however (e.g. self-detected errors), and so to compensate for this in the
current study, error observation was used. The error observation seemed to be useful
in recording errors in relation to overt actions, rather than to covert cognitive
processes, as shown by the lack of knowledge-based errors while checking. `There is
some evidence . . . that while people are good at catching their own errors of action,
they are much less good at catching their own errors of thinking, decision making,
and perception’ (Senders and Moray 1991: 78).
Error observation was useful for pointing out interface and task support factors.
The errors in the data editing part of the writing task point to the error proneness of
inputting data through a standard keyboard, which may be reduced by the use of
visual programming environments and direct manipulation of code. However, this
would then make the data writing task environment more similar to the testing task,
so reducing overall system diversity. The system-wide eŒects of such factors need
much further investigation. The inadequacy of existing manuals, the primary
reference when needing assistance, was also observed. As a further part of this
project, a computer-based `help’ application is being developed. This will include the
information contained in the existing paper-based manual, but with improved
searching and cross-referencing, and the ability to annotate and personalize the
manual to support individual working styles. Job support tools such as these may
help to reduce the problem of less training, but again research is needed to see to
what extent.
The work sample test and laboratory experiment are both types of experiment.
These were needed to study the variables identi®ed as important by earlier stages,
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e.g. task diversity. Although less controlled than experimentation in the laboratory,
the work-based version is more valid in terms of environment, task and participants.
However, when studying task-related variables for which task knowledge and
experience may matter, the use of naõÈve participants in the laboratory may be
bene®cial.
6. Conclusions
From the evidence presented above, two dimensions of variation can be identi®ed
with respect to techniques used for the investigation of human error in this study.
First, the techniques varied in their capacity to represent eventÐand therefore
errorÐfrequencies; HTA lacks the capacity of the other, more empirical, techniques
in this respect. Second, the empirical techniques diŒer in the familiar trade-oŒ
between validity and control. Error logging and observation represent highly
externally valid techniques. Laboratory experimentation represents the extreme of
control and internal validity, with work sample tests oŒering characteristics between
the two ends of the spectrum. Used here to investigate human error in safety critical
systems, analysis of human error will in any work-based system bene®t from the
application of techniques that vary in these properties.
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